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THE CHEMICALLY-DEPENDENT PHYSICIAN:
LIABILITY FOR COLLEAGUES AND HOSPITALS IN
CALIFORNIA
The chemically-dependent physician threatens the quality of
medical care provided to the public. Identification of chemically-
dependent physicians is a major obstacle to this problem's solu-
tion. This Comment examines the strengths and weaknesses of
mandatory reporting statutes, corporate hospital liability, and in-
dividual physician liability as means to promote the identification
of chemically-dependent physicians. This Comment concludes that
the doctrine of corporate hospital liability along with the imposi-
tion of a common law duty upon physicians to report impaired
colleagues are the most effective means of identifying such physi-
cians. Implementation of these concepts would also act to en-
courage utilization of California's voluntary rehabilitation
programs.
INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, the medical profession has declared drug and
alcohol addiction "[the prime occupational hazard in the practice of
medicine."1 The proliferation of articles contained in medical period-
icals about physicians' problems with drug and alcohol addiction is
demonstrative evidence of this ongoing and pressing concern.2 The
1. Talbott, Some Dynamics of Addiction Among Physicians, 65 J. MED. A. GA.
77, 77 (1976). Some reasons for drug and alcohol addiction in the medical profession are
the stress of professional responsibility, the limited time many physicians have for relaxa-
tion, the "invincibility ethos" that makes physicians feel they are not subject to addic-
tion, and the availability of a wide variety of mood-changing drugs. Id. See also Garb,
Drug Addiction in Physicians, 48 ANESTHESIA AND ANALGESIA 129, 132 (1969). One
former physician-patient confided in his therapist, "a little personal drug abuse is neces-
sary to fulfill the demands of medical practice." Little, Hazards of Drug Dependency
Among Physicians, 218 J. A.M.A. 1533, 1534 (1971).
2. See Arana, The Impaired Physician: A Medical and Social Dilemma, 4 GEN.
HosP. PSYCHIATRY 147 (1982); Johnson, Addicted Physicians: A Closer Look, 245 J.
A.M.A. 253 (1981); Shapiro, The Mentally Ill Physician as Practitioner, 232 J. A.M.A.
725 (1975); Stoudemire, When the Doctor Needs a Doctor: Special Considerations for
the Physician-Patient, 98 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 654 (1983); Talbott, Impaired
Physicians: The Dilemma of Identification, 68 POSTGRADUATE MED. 56 (1980) [herein-
after cited as Talbott, Identification]; Hall, Physician Drug Abusers, 166 J. NERVOUS &
MENTAL DISEASE 787 (1978); Talbott, Some Dynamics of Addiction Among Physicians,
65 J. MED. A. GA. 77 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Talbott, Dynamics]; The Sick Physi-
cian: Impairment by Psychiatric Disorders Including Alcoholism and Drug Dependence,
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American Medical Society has identified a class of physicians re-
ferred to as "impaired physicians," which includes those physicians
who are excessive users of drugs and alcohol. The impaired physician
is "one who is unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and
safety to patients because of physical or mental illness, including de-
terioration through the aging process or lack of motor skill, or exces-
sive use or abuse of drugs including alcohol." 3 This Comment con-
siders the physician who is impaired because of chemical dependence
on alcohol or other drugs.
The scope of the problem created by the chemically-dependent
physician is difficult to assess. The difficulties in assessment are
caused by the reluctance of some medical boards and societies to
disclose any information they have about impaired physicians.4
Available statistical information measuring the prevalence of drug
abuse and alcoholism is based on narrowly focused case series and on
information from those state medical boards that do respond to ques-
tionnaires about impaired physicians from groups researching the
problem. 5 Administrators at the Georgia Disabled Doctors Program
predict from their experience that "one of eight physicians in Geor-
gia has been, is, or will be afflicted with the disease of chemical de-
pendence."6 An estimate which incorporates the American Medical
Association's definition of the impaired physician indicates that na-
tionally, one of every ten practicing physicians is impaired.7 Overall,
the scant information available leads to the conclusion that physi-
cians are more vulnerable than the general population when it comes
to alcoholism and drug abuse.8
The effect'the chemically-dependent physician has on the quality
223 J. A.M.A. 684 (1973) (a Report of the A.M.A. Council on Mental Health) [herein-
after cited as Sick Physician].
3. Helping the Impaired Physician: Proceedings of the A.M.A. Conference on the
"Impaired Physician Answering the Challenge," Chicago, A.M.A. (Hungunin ed.
1977), reprinted in Arana, supra note 2, at 147.
4. When dealing with the impaired physician, state medical society reports are de-
scribed as being "shrouded with mystery." Hall, supra note I, at 787.
5. Stoudemire, supra note 2, at 654.
6. Talbott, Identification, supra note 2, at 56. From 1975 to 1980, 297 of Geor-
gia's 6,500 physicians were contacted as candidates for entrance into the Disabled Doc-
tors Program for Physicians Impaired by Alcohol and Drug Abuse. Of the 297 contacted,
240 entered the program. Id.
7. This estimate includes physicians impaired because of a lack of continuing edu-
cation and those physicians who for poorly understood reasons have a disproportionate
number of malpractice judgments against them.. Arana, supra note 2, at 147-48.
8. Stoudemire, supra note 2, at 654. Information leading to Dr. Stoudemire's con-
clusion was: the number of physician suicides reported each year exceeded the size of the
average medical school class, and 40% of the suicides were associated with alcoholism
and 20% with drug abuse; a British study finding physicians more than twice as likely to
die of liver disease (an end result of chronic alcoholism) than the general population; and
a study showing the frequency of narcotic addiction to be 30 to 100 times greater in
physicians than in the general population. Id.
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of medical care delivered is also difficult to assess. The Blue Cross
and Blue Shield Association estimates that impaired physicians, in-
cluding those affected by chemical dependence, are involved in pro-
viding a compromised quality of care in greater than 100 million pa-
tient visits per year.9 The chemically-dependent physician may suffer
from disordered perception causing him to respond slowly, to do less
or more than he should, or to have distorted notions of clinical
data. 10 A physician under the influence of alcohol or other drugs
may not be aware of the effects of the chemicals on his general rea-
soning process.11 Furthermore, attempting to financially support his
addiction, the chemically-dependent physician may perform unneces-
sary diagnostic tests and surgery, thereby affecting the quality of
medical care he provides. 12
Although the problem of the chemically-dependent physician was
recognized more than twenty years ago,1 a it remains unsolved today.
The solution is evasive, because of the difficulty in identifying the
chemically-dependent physician1 4 and because of the fears and
doubts that colleagues and families of the chemically-dependent phy-
sician have about programs and legislation that deal with the
problem.15
9. Pfifferling, The Impaired Physician: An Overview, HEALTH SCI. CONSORTIUM:
BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD ASS'N. 6 (1980), reprinted in Arana, supra note 2, at 148.
10. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 726-27.
11. The judgment of a physician-addict may be incredibly lacking.
[I]n delivering a baby, one addict in performing an episiotomy nonchalantly cut
through into the rectum, and with no sense of remorse whatever and no serious
attempt to repair the damage, merely remarked that he must have been a little
heavy with the knife. In other words, as far as he was concerned, he was a
normal individual at that moment.
Quinn, Narcotic Addiction: Medical and Legal Problems with Physicians, 94 CAL. MED.
214, 215-16 (1961).
12. See, e.g., Stroedel, The Impaired Physician-Hospital Corporate Liability, 24
TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 488, 490 (1981) (a surgeon performed unnecessary surgery to obtain
money to purchase drugs for personal use).
13. Since the mid-1950's, the medical literature presented reports on studies of
drug problems among physicians. Sick Physician, supra note 2, at 684. See generally,
Fox, Narcotic Addiction Among Physicians, 56 J. MICH. MED. Soc'Y 217 (1957); Mod-
lin & Montes, Narcotic Addiction in Physicians, 121 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 358 (1964);
Winick, Physician Narcotic Addicts, 9 Soc. PROBS. 174 (1961).
14. Talbott, Identification, supra note 2, at 56.
15. Arana, supra note 2, at 151.
The reluctance of colleagues and even medical societies to interfere in the life-
style and practice of colleagues is rationalized out of fear of bringing economic
ruin upon the physician and his family. Furthermore, professional and lay per-
sons alike doubt the effectiveness of treatment for alcohol and drug abuse. Fi-
nally, the reporting process already established by law in some thirty-one states
is poorly understood or feared.
This Comment examines the current California approach to the
problem of the chemically-dependent physician. The Impaired Physi-
cian Program' 6 is the legislature's effort to promote the identification
and rehabilitation of physicians who are impaired due to the abuse
of dangerous drugs and alcohol, and simultaneously protect the pub-
lic health and safety. The Impaired Physician Program is under the
auspices of the Board of Medical Quality Assurance, but is adminis-
tered by a separate diversion committee that has no punitive powers.
The diversion committee consists of members knowledgeable in the
evaluation or management of persons impaired due to alcohol or
drug abuse or due to physical or mental illness.
Participation in the California Impaired Physician Program is vol-
untary. Only those physicians who request treatment and supervision
by the diversion committee are considered for the program. The di-
version committee formulates an individual treatment plan for each
participating physician. The physician is allowed to continue his
medical practice under the supervision and surveillance of the com-
mittee if the committee determines the physician will not jeopardize
the safety of his patients. When the diversion committee determines
that a physician is rehabilitated, he resumes his medical practice
without supervision. All records pertaining to the physician's partici-
pation in the program are then destroyed.
The California Impaired Physician Program has been criticized
because it does not require colleagues who know of an impaired phy-
sician to report the impaired physician to the Board of Medical
Quality Assurance.17 The results of mandatory reporting require-
ments in other states will be examined to determine whether the ad-
dition of a mandatory reporting requirement would strengthen or
weaken the effectiveness of the California program.
A California appellate court in Elam v. College Park Hospital1 8
has recognized the independent duty of a hospital to exercise reason-
able care in selecting, reviewing, and evaluating its staff physicians.
In Elam, the hospital had potential corporate liability for its failure
to restrict a podiatrist's practice when the hospital administration
knew or should have known of the podiatrist's incompetence. 19 This
Comment suggests that if the doctrine of corporate hospital liability
in Elam is extended to include recognition of the chemically-depen-
dent physician and restriction of his practice, the risk of harm to the
public will be lessened.
Id.
16. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, R. 33 (1983).
17. See Comment, The Impaired Physician: An Old Problem Creates the Need for
New Legislation, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 727, 731 (1982).
18. 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982).
19. Id. at 341, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
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Another area explored is the influence of legislative policy on the
recognition of a common law duty for colleagues of the chemically-
dependent physician. The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act
of 197520 provided the California physician with protection from the
limitless expansion of malpractice damages. In exchange for this
protection, the legislature forced the medical profession to become
more accountable. 21 This Comment proposes that the California ju-
diciary consider this legislative policy of accountability in conjunc-
tion with the foreseeable risk of harm to the public and recognize the
existence of a special relationship among physicians. This special re-
lationship would support the application of a duty to exercise reason-
able care for the protection of third parties, as recognized in
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California2 2 to the col-
leagues of the chemically-dependent physician.
IMPAIRED PHYSICIAN PROGRAMS
California Procedure
Prior to the enactment of the Impaired Physician Program the
Board of Medical Quality Assurance would investigate after receiv-
ing notice of possible physician impairment.23 If the investigation
disclosed a physician who appeared to be impaired, a formal hearing
was held before a regional Medical Quality Review Committee. A
review committee's finding of impairment resulted in revocation or
suspension of the physician's license. 24 A stay was placed on the rev-
20. 1975 Cal. Stat. 2d Ex. Sess. Ch. 1, § 24.6 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §
3333.2 (Deering Supp. 1983)).
21. Measures taken to promote accountability included the formation of the Board
of Medical Quality Assurance which is composed of public representatives as well as
representatives of the medical profession, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2001 (Deering
Supp. 1983), the enactment of legislation requiring mandatory reporting by insurers of
malpractice awards over three thousand dollars, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 801 (Deer-
ing Supp. 1983), and mandatory reporting by hospitals of privilege restrictions and disci-
plinary actions taken against staff physicians. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 805 (Deering
Supp. 1983).
22. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
23. Investigations of physician impairment were instituted by the Board of Medi-
cal Quality Assurance most frequently because of complaints made by patients or other
members of the public. Carlova, California: A Little Kindness and a Lot of Clout, 56
MED. ECON. 132 (1979).
24. The self-administration of drugs or alcohol to the extent that it would impair
the licensee's ability to practice medicine constitutes unprofessional conduct. CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 2239 (Deering Supp. 1983). The Board of Medical Quality Assurance
has a legal duty to take action against any licensee charged with unprofessional conduct.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2234 (Deering Supp. 1983).
ocation or suspension if the physician agreed to terms and conditions
of probation as prescribed by the review committee and if the review
committee found that allowing the physician to practice would not
jeopardize public health and safety.25
A physician who voluntarily submitted to the Board of Medical
Quality Assurance for rehabilitation faced identical administrative
sanctions as the physician whose impairment was revealed through
investigation. The punitive nature of this process created a disincen-
tive for an impaired physician to voluntarily report for rehabilitation
or for colleagues to urge an impaired physician to submit to the
board for rehabilitation. 28 The Impaired Physician Program was de-
veloped to remedy this problem.27
The Impaired Physician Program goals are to rehabilitate im-
paired physicians and to protect public health and safety.28 The di-
version committee in charge of the program has no punitive powers
and will only report the impaired physician to the Board of Medical
Quality Assurance for disciplinary action if the impaired physician
fails in the treatment program. 29 The Impaired Physician Program is
characterized as preventative in nature rather than remedial.30 De-
monstrative of this preventative nature is that an impaired physi-
cian's colleagues and family will more often confront him with his
problem and urge him to seek rehabilitation before any impairment
of his clinical ability occurs if the committee he reports to is rehabil-
itative rather than punitive.31
Types of Impaired Physician Statutes
Impaired physician statutes can be distinguished by the presence
or absence of a mandatory reporting requirement. In those statutes
which have a mandatory reporting requirement, a physician who
knows of a colleague's impairment must report the impaired col-
league to the regulatory board for physician practice. The statutes
which have a mandatory reporting requirement are subcategorized
into those which require a physician who is treating an impaired
physician to report, and those which protect the physician-patient
25. Carlova, supra note 23, at 134-36.
26. Id. at 142.
27. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, R. 33 (1983).
28. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2340 (Deering Supp. 1983).
29. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, R. 33 (1983). In California, the diversion commit-
tee is required to report any physician who terminates the voluntary program for any
reason other than successful completion to the Division of Medical Quality of the Board
of Medical Quality Assurance. Id.
30. The American Medical Association indicates that an advantage of the im-
paired physician programs is that action to restrict the physician's practice can be taken
before patient injury occurs. Sick Physician, supra note 2, at 686.
31. Rosenberg, Tougher Doctor-Policing Laws, 56 MED. ECON. 108, 125-26
(1979).
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relationship and do not require a treating physician to report the im-
paired physician-patient. Under the statutes which protect the physi-
cian-patient relationship, non-treating physicians are still required to
report their impaired colleagues.3 2
Advocates of mandatory reporting argue the only effective means
of prompting physicians to identify their impaired colleagues is to
impose a statutory duty to report.33 The failure of a physician to
report an impaired colleague is unprofessional conduct and grounds
for discipline against the non-reporting physician by the regulatory
board. 4 If a known impaired physician injured a patient because of
his impairment, a physician who failed to make the mandatory re-
port would be personally liable for the injury.3 5 To avoid potential
personal liability or discipline, physicians must report their impaired
colleagues.
Although advocates of mandatory reporting view the statutory
duty as the best method to facilitate the identification of the im-
paired physician, proponents of voluntary reporting criticize
mandatory reporting requirements as conflicting with the rehabilita-
tive purpose of impaired physician programs. These proponents as-
sert if impaired physicians think a program administrator is required
to report them to a regulatory board having punitive powers, few will
voluntarily submit themselves for treatment.36 Moreover, physicians
will be fearful that they may cost a colleague his license and will be
dissuaded from urging an impaired colleague whose quality of prac-
tice has not significantly suffered to seek rehabilitation. 7 Proponents
of voluntary reporting define the role of medical practitioners in
identifying and rehabilitating their impaired colleagues and in pro-
tecting the public from injury by the impaired physician as an ethi-
cal responsibility rather than a legal duty.38
32. Comment, supra note 17, at 730.
33. See id. at 749.
34. See id. at 746.
35. See id. at 747-49.
36. See Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 128.
37. Twerski, You Can Help Colleagues Who Have Problems, LEGAL ASP. MED.
PRAC., May 1980, at 18.
38. The observations and recommendations of the American Medical Association
Council on Mental Health include, "It is a physician's ethical responsibility to take cog-
nizance of a colleague's inability to practice medicine adequately by reason of physical or
mental illness, including alcoholism or drug dependence." Sick Physician, supra note 2,
at 684. See also Comment, supra note 17, at 731 (Executive Director of California's
Board of Medical Quality Assurance states that the responsibility to deal with impaired
physicians is an ethical rather than legal issue). The consensus of medical societies, li-
censing boards, and state committees is that noncoercive confrontation by a colleague is
Effects of Mandatory Reporting
Initial reports from two states which enacted mandatory reporting
requirements, after previously functioning with a voluntary reporting
program, did not reveal an increased rate of reporting. 9 Addition-
ally, in New York, the physician-administrators of the Voluntary
Physician's Committee 40 charged that the mandatory reporting re-
quirement undermined their efforts. With the implementation of
mandatory reporting, the voluntary committee stopped receiving re-
ports of impaired physicians. The fear that members of the voluntary
committee, under a statutory duty to report, would inform the regu-
latory board of the impaired physician stopped family and colleagues
from seeking the voluntary committee's assistance.41 The New York
Legislature recognized this problem and amended their mandatory
reporting requirement to exempt those physicians who are members
of a state medical society's voluntary committee for the rehabilita-
tion of impaired physicians from general reporting requirements.42
Since this exemption was created, cooperation has existed between
the New York Legislature, the state medical society, and the state
department of health. 3
This information indicates that a mandatory reporting statute that
does not exempt members of rehabilitation committees from general
reporting requirements conflicts with the stated purposes of impaired
physician programs: to persuade impaired physicians to voluntarily
seek rehabilitation and to protect public health and safety. Without
such an exemption, physicians are not encouraged to deal with the
problem of chemical dependence at an early stage, that is, before a
physician's clinical ability is impaired; 4 instead, physicians are dis-
couraged from identifying. an impaired colleague until the chance of
harm to patients is imminent.
the best hope for initiating modification of behavior in the impaired physician. Arana,
supra note 2, at 151-52.
39. After Arizona implemented mandatory reporting requirements, complaints re-
ceived from physicians about impaired colleagues rose from one complaint every two
months to two complaints a month. New York showed no change in the number of re-
ports received after mandatory reporting was enacted. Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 127-
28.
40. Some medical societies formed committees which network identified impaired
physicians into a rehabilitation program not under the auspices of the state board. One
advantage of these programs was their purely rehabilitative, non-punitive approach. See
id. at 128.
41. See id.
42. Fama, Reporting Incompetent Physicians: A Comparison of Requirements in
Three States, LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE, June 1983, at 115 (discussing N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 230(11)(c)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983)).
43. Id. at 115-16.
44. A study done by Talbott with the Georgia Disabled Doctors Program reveals
that usually the last sign of physician impairment is an objective change in a physician's
clinical ability. Talbott, Identification, supra note 2, at 58.
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Further evidence of the ineffectiveness of mandatory reporting is
illustrated in those statutes which provide for disciplinary action
against the non-reporting physician. Whether the threat of discipli-
nary action against a non-reporting physician is an effective method
of promoting the identification of impaired physicians is questiona-
ble., 5 A survey of states having mandatory reporting requirements
reveals no instance where a physician received discipline for failure
to report an impaired colleague.'
Empty threats of disciplinary action for non-reporting do not
strengthen mandatory reporting and tend to decrease the credibility
of a mandatory reporting statute.
California's Impaired Physician Program
California enacted an Impaired Physician Program in 1980 which
did not include a mandatory reporting requirement.' This program
was developed to encourage impaired physicians to voluntarily seek
treatment 8 and rehabilitation before their clinical abilities were im-
paired causing a threat to public health and safety.49 Voluntary en-
rollment in the program would result in a type of immunity. The
enrolled impaired physician would be immune to any disciplinary
measures by the Board. In comparison, those impaired physicians
discovered through investigations resulting from complaints received
by the Board of Medical Quality Assurance would be subject to the
disciplinary measures of the Board and would not be afforded the
protection and benefits of the Impaired Physician Program.
Because the premise of the Impaired Physician Program was vol-
untary rehabilitation, the Board of Medical Quality Assurance found
the inclusion of a mandatory reporting requirement unnecessary.
The Board viewed the role of physicians in persuading their impaired
colleagues to seek treatment as an ethical responsibility rather than
45. The fear of being drawn into a chemically-dependent physician's malpractice
action has proven to be a strong force in motivating physicians to report their impaired
colleagues. Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 125-26.
46. Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 131-32.
47. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, R. 33 (1983).
48. "Only those physicians and surgeons who have voluntarily requested diversion
treatment and supervision by a committee shall participate in a program." CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 2350(a) (Deering Supp. 1983).
49. The legislative intent of the Impaired Physicians Program was to provide a
means of identifying and rehabilitating impaired physicians and to return them to the
practice of medicine in a manner which would not endanger the public health and safety.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2340 (Deering Supp. 1983).
a legal duty to be imposed by a mandatory reporting statute.50 The
mandatory reporting of the restriction of staff physician privileges by
hospitals for any medical disciplinary cause or reason 51 and of mal-
practice awards over three thousand dollars by insurers 52 combined
with the participation of the public53 were reasoned adequate mea-
sures to reveal the impaired physician whose quality of practice had
suffered because of his impairment.
5 4
The disincentives and questionable effectiveness of mandatory re-
porting, and the voluntary foundation of the Impaired Physician Pro-
gram indicate that the California Impaired Physician Program
would not be strengthened by the addition of a mandatory reporting
requirement. The gap left by the absence of a mandatory reporting
requirement would be closed by existing common law doctrines. 5
These doctrines would place liability on the individual physician for
failing to report a colleague he knows is impaired and is not under-
going treatment, or on the hospital for failing to restrict the practice
of a physician that the hospital administration knew or should have
known was impaired.
CORPORATE HOSPITAL LIABILITY
Foundation of the Doctrine
Prior to the creation of the doctrine of corporate hospital liability
in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,5 6 a hospi-
tal was liable for injuries caused by a physician if an employer-em-
ployee 57 or agency 58 relationship existed between the incompetent
physician and the hospital. In Darling, the court recognized the
changing role of the hospital 9 and placed a duty of care on the hos-
50. Comment, supra note 17, at 731.
51. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 805 (Deering Supp. 1983). A pattern of repeated
malpractice settlements may indicate impairment. See Carlova, supra note 23, at 138;
Talbott, Identification, supra note 2, at 61.
52. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 801 (Deering Supp. 1983).
53. See supra note 23.
54. Carlova, supra note 23, at 138-42.
55. In the past the California courts have expanded common law doctrines jn order
to achieve their goals of loss distribution and accident reduction. See Levy & Ursin, Tort
Law in California: At the Crossroads, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 497 (1979).
56. 33 111. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
57. See, e.g., Rice v. California Lutheran Hospital, 27 Cal. 2d 296, 163 P.2d 860
(1945) (a hospital may be liable for the physician-employee's acts even though the acts
are professional in nature).
58. See, e.g., Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955) (a hospital
may be liable for physician's acts when the hospital intentionally or by want of ordinary
care causes a patient to reasonably believe a physician is its agent when the physician is
not actually employed by it).
59. 33 111. 2d at 330, 211 N.E.2d at 257. "Present-day hospitals . . . do far more
than furnish facilities for treatment . . . . [T]he person who avails himself of 'hospital
facilities' expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other
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pital to maintain a qualified medical staff.60 An increasing number
of states" have recognized the doctrine of corporate hospital liabil-
ity.62 The general duties placed on the hospital include a duty to
review the medical care given to patients by staff physicians, a duty
to suspend or restrict privileges of physicians found incompetent, and
a duty to use reasonable care in the initial selection of physicians for
the medical staff.
6 3
The foundation for corporate hospital liability lies in the legisla-
ture's adoption of voluntary standards" as minimum requirements
employees will act on their own responsibility." Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 666, 143
N.E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11 (1957).
60. 33 Ill. 2d at 330, 211 N.E.2d at 257. The "medical staff" is the organization of
physicians who have been granted staff privileges at a hospital. See CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 2282 (Deering Supp. 1983); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 32128 (Deering
Supp. 1983).
61. See Tucson Medical Center Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958
(1976); Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972);
Hull v. North Valley Hosp., 159 Mont. 375, 498 P.2d 136 (1972); Gridley v. Johnson,
476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972); Foley v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 185 Neb. 89,
173 N.W.2d 881 (1970); Moore v. Board of Trustees of Carson Tahoe Hosp., 88 Nev.
207, 495 P.2d 605 (1972); Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350
A.2d 534 (1975); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967); Kitto
v. Gilbert, 39 Colo. App. 374, 570 P.2d 544 (1977); Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 64 Mich. App.
685, 236 N.W.2d 543 (1975); Felice v. St. Agnes Hosp., 65 A.D.2d 338, 411 N.Y.S.2d
901 (1978); Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391 (1980).
62. The scope of this Comment precludes an extensive review of the doctrine of
hospital corporate liability. For a complete discussion of the subject see Southwick, The
Hospital's New Responsibility, 17 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 146 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Southwick, The Hospital's New Responsibility]; Southwick, The Hospital as an Institu-
tion-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9
CAL. W.L. REV. 429 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Southwick, The Hospital as an Institu-
tion]; Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility for Mal-
practice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REV. 385 (1975); Comment, The Hospital and the
Staff Physician: An Expanding Duty of Care, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 249 (1974); Com-
ment, The Hospital's Responsibility for Its Medical Staff. Prospects for Corporate Neg-
ligence in California, 8 PAC. L.J. 141 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Hospital's
Responsibility]; Comment, Piercing the Doctrine of Corporate Hospital Liability, 17
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 383 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Piercing the Doctrine of
Corporate Hospital Liability]; Note, Hospital Corporate Liability: An Effective Solu-
tion to Controlling Private Physician Incompetence?, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 342 (1979).
63. Comment, Piercing the Doctrine of Corporate Hospital Liability, supra note
62, at 390.
64. Standards drafted by voluntary authorities such as the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals have no force of law unless some affirmative action is taken by
the legislature or the judiciary. Dornette, The Legal Impact on Voluntary Standards in
Civil Actions Against the Health Care Provider, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 925, 931
(1977). The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH), the foremost vol-
untary standards-making organization, is concerned with upgrading the quality of hospi-
tal care. The American College of Surgeons, the American College of Physicians, the
American Medical Association, and the American Hospital Association financially con-
tribute to and provide representatives for the JCAH. Id. at 925.
for the operation of a hospital, 5 or in a hospital voluntarily assuming
such standards in order to achieve accreditation.66 Once a breach of
the voluntary standard occurs, courts may adopt the voluntary stan-
dard as a measurement of the standard of care owed by the hospital
to its patients.
6 7
The doctrine of corporate hospital liability does not make the hos-
pital vicariously liable for all acts of its staff physicians. To success-
fully bring an action against the hospital, the plaintiff must show
that the hospital, through its administration, breached an indepen-
dent duty owed to its patients.6 8 This duty of care is breached if a
hospital fails to restrict the privileges of a physician after notice of
the physician's technical incompetence.6 9
The degree of notice a hospital must have regarding a physician's
incompetence before liability will be imposed for failing to restrict
the physician's privileges varies among jurisdictions. At one end of
the spectrum, any information held by the medical staff would be
imputed to the hospital administration. This approach would make
the hospital liable even if the medical staff intentionally or negli-
gently failed to inform the administration of suspected incompe-
tence.70 At the other extreme, the hospital would not be liable unless
the administration had actual notice of a physician's incompetence. 1
The requirement of actual notice has been criticized for rewarding
intentional efforts by the hospital to stay uninformed.72
65. In California, public hospitals are required to appoint, reappoint, and organize
the medical staff according to the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals'
(JCAH) standards. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 32128 (Deering Supp. 1983); see
supra note 64 for an explanation of the JCAH.
66. Many incentives exist for private hospitals to seek accreditation by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH). See supra note 64. Those accredited
by the JCAH are in compliance with a substantial number of conditions for participation
in Medicare and receive substantially lower premiums from insurance carriers. Dornette,
supra note 64, at 927-28.
67. See Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (1967). Ac-
cord Foley v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 185 Neb. 89, 173 N.W.2d 881, 884
(1970).
68. Comment, Hospital's Responsibility, supra note 62, at 142.
[T]he hospital is viewed as owing certain duties directly to the patients treated
within its facilities-duties that transcend the line between hospital administra-
tion and medical treatment. If it is established that the hospital has failed to
fulfill this duty of care in a particular case, the hospital may face direct tort
liability for any injuries resulting therefrom.
Id.
69. Technical incompetence refers to a physician lacking skill because he does not
have the education or training required to provide medical care for a specific problem.
See Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972).
70. See Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307,
308 (1971).
71. See Hull v. North Valley Hosp., 159 Mont. 375, 498 P.2d 136, 143 (1972).
72. See Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution, supra note 62, at 448.
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Application of Corporate Hospital Liability in California
California's adoption of the doctrine occurred in Elam v. College
Park Hospital.7 . In Elam, the court used the concept of foreseeabil-
ity to create a duty of care owed by the hospital to its patients7 4 The
court concluded that a foreseeable risk of harm to patients arose if a
hospital failed to maintain a competent medical staff through the
careful review, selection, and evaluation of that staff.75 The court
used the legislature's adoption7 6 of the standards of the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Hospitals" to substantiate their conclu-
sion that a hospital "owes generally a duty to insure the competency
of its medical staff and to evaluate the quality of medical treatment
rendered on its premises. '78 In Elam, the court noted the medical
staff, not the hospital administration, would be responsible for re-
viewing physician competency; but the court indicated the hospital
would be held liable for the review since "the governing body of the
hospital is responsible for establishing the review procedures. '7 9
The California court viewed the imposition of a duty of care owed
to patients by hospitals as creating an incentive for the hospital to
become more aware of its medical staff's competence. The imposition
of a duty on the hospital was reasoned to be an effective means to
reduce unreasonable harm to patients because the hospital, through
its medical staff, would be in the best position to evaluate the physi-
cians practicing within its facilities.80 In addition to creating an in-
centive for the prevention of harm to patients, the court viewed the
doctrine of corporate hospital liability as providing victims another
avenue for relief. The court concluded that the doctrine of corporate
hospital liability was consistent with legislative policy concerned with
the furtherance and protection of the health care interest of the
patient.81
73. 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982).
74. Id. at 340, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61.
75. Id. at 341, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
76. Id. at 341-42, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 161-62.
77. See supra note 64.
78. 132 Cal. App. at 347, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
79. Id. at 342, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
80. Id. at 345, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
81. Id. at 346-47, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
Application of Corporate Hospital Liability to the Chemically-
Dependent Physician
The threat to the patient's health care from chemically-dependent
physicians is equivalent to the threat created by technically incompe-
tent physicians. Although the hospital is recognized as being in the
best position to detect a physician's incompetence,8 2 the hospital's
ability to detect the chemically-dependent physician may be more
limited. The problem arises because no definitive signs of impair-
ment may appear with the chemically-dependent physician; instead,
only tentative or spurious warnings may emanate from his behavior.
Cases in which the hospital has actual notice of a physician's
chemical dependence are handled without difficulty. For example, li-
ability was imposed on the hospital in Penn Tanker Co. v. United
States83 when a patient lost his sight after being incorrectly diag-
nosed and treated by an ophthalmologist who was a known alcoholic.
In Penn Tanker Co., the rehabilitation program administrator rec-
ommended to the hospital that the ophthalmologist be allowed to re-
sume a limited practice but that he should not perform surgery. The
hospital allowed the ophthalmologist to resume an unrestricted prac-
tice and to perform surgery. The court found the hospital negligent
for not enforcing the restrictions placed upon the ophthalmologist
and this failure to restrict the ophthalmologist's practice was judged
a proximate cause of the patient's injury.
84
The hospital, however, will not always have actual notice of a phy-
sician's chemical dependence. In those cases demonstrating an objec-
tive deterioration in the quality of care provided by the chemically-
dependent physician, the hospital's liability will be determined simi-
larly to other areas of incompetency. The considerations are: (1) was
the hospital negligent in its review of the physician?; and (2) if the
hospital had been diligent in its review and evaluation of the physi-
cian, would information have been revealed that would have led to
the hospital restricting or limiting the physician's privileges?
85 If
both these questions are answered affirmatively, the hospital's failure
to restrict and enforce limitations on the physician's hospital privi-
leges would be deemed a proximate cause of any injury caused by
82. Colleagues and nurses are usually in a position to observe behavior daily. Note,
Hospital Corporate Liability, supra note 62, at 376. The hospital administrator has
closer contact with more sources of information than any other person in the hospital.
These sources may reveal changing behavior patterns indicating impairment. Williams,
The Quandary of the Hospital Administrator in Dealing with the Medical Malpractice
Problem, 55 NEB. L. REv. 401, 406 (1976).
83. 310 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
84. Id. at 618.
85. See Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 64 Mich. App. 685, 236 N.W.2d 543, 550 (1975);
accord Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 347-48, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156,
165-66 (1980).
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the chemically-dependent physician. 86
A more difficult situation arises when the physician's chemical de-
pendence has not affected the quality of patient care. 7 Chemical de-
pendence is a gradual and growing affliction. Characteristically, an
antecedent behavior pattern indicates the possibility of chemical de-
pendence. Included in this behavior are changes in employment pat-
terns such as numerous job changes, frequent geographic relocations
for unexplained reasons, unexplained intervals between jobs, indefi-
nite or inappropriate references, and reluctance to undergo immedi-
ate pre-employment physical examination.88 A hospital's failure to
investigate any staff physician who demonstrates some of the charac-
teristics of the chemical dependence antecedent behavior pattern,
and to restrict or suspend the physician's privilege if chemical depen-
dence is found, should be considered negligence and a proximate
cause of any injury inflicted because of the physician's chemical
dependence.8 9
A recognized problem with the doctrine of corporate hospital lia-
bility is the hospital must rely primarily on the medical staff for ini-
tial and continuing evaluation of staff physicians. If the medical staff
is not diligent in discharging this evaluation process, then the hospi-
tal may be liable for information that has been negligently or inten-
tionally withheld.90 Therefore, the medical staff must be accountable
86. In Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972), the Depart-
ment of Surgery was aware of malpractice claims for performing unnecessary radical
surgery against the defendant surgeon. Since the department in supervising and review-
ing its members was acting on behalf of the hospital, its failure to take action was con-
sidered to be the hospital's negligence. Failure of the hospital to restrict the physician's
privileges was the threshold negligent event and a proximate cause of the patient's injury.
Id. at 80-83, 500 P.2d at 340-43.
87. See supra note 44.
88. The Talbott study shows that signs of physician impairment usually appear in
a recognizable order. Behavior areas affected are community involvement, family life,
employment patterns, physical status, office conduct, and hospital duties. Signs of impair-
ment may be apparent on initial application to the hospital for staff privileges. Talbott,
Identification, supra note 2, at 58.
89. In Elam v. College Park Hospital, 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156
(1982), the hospital administration was aware of a malpractice action against a staff
podiatrist. This malpractice claim was sufficient to give the hospital constructive notice of
the podiatrist's incompetence. The Elam court held that if a diligent investigation would
have revealed the podiatrist's technical incompetence, then the hospital's failure to inves-
tigate and to restrict the podiatrist's hospital privileges created a foreseeable risk of harm
to patients and would be a proximate cause of an injury due to the incompetence. Id. at
346, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 165. Constructive notice of a physician's chemical dependence
should create the same duty to investigate and restrict as technical incompetence. See
Tucson Med. Center Inc. v. Misevch, 133 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976).
90. See Comment, Piercing the Doctrine of Corporate Hospital Liability, supra
if corporate hospital liability is to be effective as a means of identify-
ing the chemically-dependent physician. One method to ensure the
medical staff's accountability is to allow a patient injured by an im-
paired physician to bring suit against the medical staff as an unin-
corporated association. A second method is to allow the hospital to
dismiss a silent staff member.
LIABILITY OF THE MEDICAL STAFF
The Medical Staff as an Unincorporated Association
A procedural decision made by a New Jersey appellate court in
Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hospital1 recognized the role of the
medical staff in evaluating and reviewing staff physicians. The New
Jersey court decided that a medical staff could be sued as an unin-
corporated association9 2 for its failure to effectively screen its mem-
bers for competence. One reason behind this decision was that the
individual members of the medical staff could be sued independently,
but an action against them collectively would provide for judicial ef-
ficiency.9 3 In a different situation, the South Dakota Supreme Court
allowed a medical staff to bring an action as an unincorporated asso-
ciation against a hospital.
94
These cases are important because the medical staff was recog-
nized as a legal entity for judicial proceedings. In California, courts
have treated medical staffs and societies as unincorporated associa-
tions;95 therefore, a successful action could be maintained against a
medical staff as an unincorporated association when it has failed to
reasonably evaluate a staff member who demonstrates the antece-
dent behavior pattern of chemical dependence.
The effectiveness of such actions in promoting accountability is
questionable. The medical staff is organized under the auspices of
the hospital, 8 and is without assets as an unincorporated association.
note 62, at 398-99.
91. 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975).
92. In Corleto the question of the medical staff's liability was never reached. The
negligent physician's insurance company settled prior to trial. Horty & Mulholland, The
Legal Status of the Hospital Medical Staff, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 485, 487 (1978).
93. 138 N.J. Super. at 307, 350 A.2d at 539.
94. St. John's Hosp. Medical Staff v. St. John Regional Medical Center, Inc., 90
S.D. 674, 245 N.W.2d 472 (1976).
95. In an action by a physician against a hospital for wrongful exclusion from the
medical staff, the court treated the medical staff as an unincorporated association. West-
lake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 465, 551 P.2d 410, 131 Cal. Rptr.
90 (1976); accord Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc., 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114
Cal. Rptr. 681 (1974). But see Horty & Mulholland, supra note 92, at 497-99 (the
characteristics of a medical staff do not meet the criteria for an unincorporated associa-
tion; the medical staff as a body has no separate life or legal rights from the hospital, to
sue or be sued).
96. The governing body of a hospital must have provisions for the formal organi-
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A money judgment against the medical staff as an unincorporated
association could only be enforced against the association's assets.
9 7
Therefore, in most instances, the medical staff would be immune
from enforcement of a judgment. The practical effect of a suit
against the medical staff as an unincorporated association for its fail-
ure to act upon notice of possible chemical dependence in one of its
members would be reduced to a nullity.
The Silent Staff Member
A more effective means to promote accountability of medical staff
members is recognition of the right of the hospital to dismiss physi-
cians who withhold information about impaired colleagues.9 8 The
American Medical Association's standard for ethical conduct states
physicians are ethically responsible to take cognizance of their im-
paired colleagues. 99 This standard for ethical conduct is violated by
the medical staff member who knows of a colleague's chemical de-
pendence and does not take action that would protect the public
from the foreseeable risk of harm created by his chemically-depen-
dent colleague. Hospitals are legally required to restrict medical staff
membership to those physicians competent in their respective fields
and who meet standards of professional ethics.100 The silence and
inaction of a medical staff member could be construed as a violation
of this ethical standard and serve as grounds for dismissal from the
medical staff.101 Because much of a physician's practice is associated
with the hospital, 0 2 this potential loss of hospital privileges would
zation of a medical staff. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 7 (1983).
97. A money judgment against an unincorporated association may be enforced
only against the association's property. CAL. CORP. CODE § 24002 (Deering Supp. 1983).
98. A hospital's power to unilaterally terminate a physician's staff privileges,
thereby influencing the physician's opportunity to pursue his livelihood, is limited by due
process considerations. Comment, Piercing the Doctrine of Corporate Hospital Liability,
supra note 62, at 395. See Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 567
P.2d 1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977); Hirsch, A Fish Without Water: Hospital Admit-
ting Privileges, CASE & CoM., July-Aug. 1979, at 18; Comment, Hospital Medical Staff
Privileges: Recent Developments in Procedural Due Process Requirements, 12 WILLAM-
rE L.J. 137, 139-50 (1975-1976).
99. See Sick Physician, supra note 2, at 684.
100. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 7 (1983).
101. The threat of dismissal from the medical staff has been proposed as an effec-
tive means of making the medical staff accountable to the hospital. See Stroedel, Thy
Brother's Keeper: Responsibility for the "Impaired Physician," LEGAL Asp. OF MED.
PRAC., Dec. 1983, at 3.
102. The technical advances in medicine and medical specialization have caused
the practice of physicians to become more and more hospital oriented. Southwick, The
Hospital's New Responsibility, supra note 62, at 161.
effectively function to promote medical staff accountability.
LIABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL PHYSICIANS
Corleto suggests the existence of a duty owed to patients by the
individual medical staff members who work closely with the alleged
impaired physician. 103 If such a duty exists, then a physician 04 who
fails to take action when aware of a chemically-dependent colleague
who is not voluntarily undergoing treatment would be liable for the
damage caused by his impaired colleague. The physician's
knowledge and subsequent inaction would be viewed as a proximate
cause of the patient's injuries. Before liability can be placed on the
individual physician, a duty must exist requiring him to take the nec-
essary action that would protect the public from the risk created by
the chemically-dependent physician.105
The California Supreme Court takes an expansive position on the
question of duty.106 Duty is "an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular
plaintiff is entitled to protection."107 The court's position on duty ex-
panded further when it found the primary consideration in determin-
ing duty was the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff. Although the
existence of a duty is a question of law, foreseeability is a question of
fact for the jury.108 The court used this concept to create liability
where none previously existed. In Landeros v. Flood,10  the court
found a physician to have a duty to correctly diagnose his patient's
battered-child syndrome and to report this abuse to authorities.110
Another example of the court's expansive holdings on the question
of duty is Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California.11 The
Tarasoff court found a psychologist liable for the death of his pa-
103. Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534, 536
(1975).
104. Although in some states a statutory duty has been created requiring health-
care professionals to report an impaired physician, see Fama, supra note 42, at 114-15,
this Comment is limited to the physician's duty to report his impaired colleagues.
105. The essential elements of actionable negligence include a defendant's legal
duty to use due care, a breach of that duty, and the breach as a proximate or legal cause
of the resulting injury. United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., I Cal. 3d
586, 594, 463 P.2d 770, 774, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418, 422 (1970); George A. Hormel & Co. v.
Maez, 92 Cal. App. 3d 963, 966, 155 Cal. Rptr. 337, 339 (1979).
106. For a discussion of the California Supreme Court's trend towards the expan-
sion of incidence of liability, see Levy & Ursin, supra note 55, at 498-500, 504-11, 515-
18.
107. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76
(1968).
108. Weirum v. RKO General Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 471 (1975).
109. 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
110. Id. at 412, 551 P.2d at 395-96, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 75-76.
111. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
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tient's victim when he failed to warn the victim of the harm
threatened by his patient during a therapy session."' The Tarasoff
rationale should be extended to impose liability on the physician who
knows of a colleague's untreated chemical dependence and who fails
to report the colleague to the Board of Medical Quality Assurance.
This liability would be based on a duty to exercise reasonable care
for the protection of a third party.
The Tarasoff court recognized the common law rules that gener-
ally one person owes no duty to control the conduct of another in
order to protect a third party nor to warn those endangered by such
conduct.11 3 However, exceptions to these rules exist when the defend-
ant stands in some special relationship to either the person whose
conduct needs to be controlled or to the foreseeable victim of the
person whose conduct needs controlling. 4 Relationships which sup-
port such an affirmative duty have been expanded to further the pol-
icy of accident reduction and that of spreading accident losses
through insurance.11 5
The medical profession receives special treatment from the judici-
ary and the legislature. The physician's standard of care is one of
"good medical practice" or what is "customary and usual in the pro-
fession." 1 6 To protect physicians from expanding malpractice
awards, a statutory limit is placed on damage awards for non-eco-
nomic loss. 117 This special treatment creates and supports the pub-
lic's expectations that physicians will police their own ranks1 8 and
112. Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 347-48, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27-8.
113. Id. at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
114. Id. at 435 n.5, 551 P.2d at 343 n.5, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23 n.5.
115. See Levy & Ursin, supra note 55, at 515-18.
116. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 162-65 (4th ed.
1971). Generally custom is not conclusive on deciding whether an act is negligent or non-
negligent. Id. at 167-68. Traditionally the physician's standard of care was the practice
of the medical profession in the same locality. Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465,
473, 234 P.2d 34, 39 (1951). The recent approach is to expand the physician's standard
of care to the practice of the medical profession under similar circumstances. See Cobbs
v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244-45, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972) (a
physician must provide information that a skilled practitioner would provide under simi-
lar circumstances).
117. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (Deering Supp. 1983).
118. It is recognized that for years physicians have been responsible for self-polic-
ing. For the most part physicians are in charge of disciplinary agencies. Rosenberg,
supra note 31, at 108. In California the Board of Medical Quality Assurance (BMQA) is
composed of 19 members, 12 of whom are physicians. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2001
(Deering Supp. 1983). The BMQA's Division of Medical Quality which is the discipli-
nary branch is composed of seven members, four of whom are physicians. CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 2008 (Deering Supp. 1983).
insure that only quality health care be delivered. It also supports the
legislative policy that physicians be accountable for the quality of
health care provided." 9 Public expectations and legislative policy
create a special relationship among physicians. This relationship sup-
ports the imposition of a common law duty to report upon those col-
leagues who have knowledge of a chemically-dependent physician
who refuses to voluntarily undergo rehabilitation.
Policy considerations noted in TarasofflI2 also support the imposi-
tion of a duty on the colleague to report the chemically-dependent
physician. The California Supreme Court has articulated several pol-
icy considerations to be balanced when determining whether a duty
exists as a matter of law. These policy considerations are:
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defend-
ant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the de-
fendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a
duty to exercise care with the resulting liability for breach, and the availa-
bility, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.121
The foreseeable risk of harm created by a physician who refuses to
report an untreated chemically-dependent colleague is clear. The
chemical dependence may at any time cause the physician's reason-
ing process to deteriorate, resulting in harm to the patient. The oc-
currence of this deterioration is -not predictable, therefore action
must be taken at the first sign of chemical dependence to prevent the
occurrence of future harm. Responsibility for taking action to pre-
vent harm to the public by the chemically-dependent physician is an
ethical responsibility proposed by the American Medical Associa-
tion.122 A failure to meet this responsibility should be construed as
morally blameworthy conduct. If a physician had met this responsi-
bility and reported a chemically-dependent physician who refused to
undergo voluntary rehabilitation, immediate action could restrict the
suspected physician's practice.1 23 By reporting an untreated chemi-
cally-dependent colleague, the physician's duty to exercise due care
would be fulfilled, and the public would be afforded greater protec-
tion from unnecessary risks of harm.
Courts rarely recognize a relationship between a physician and a
119. For a description of legislative measures used to promote the accountability of
the medical profession, see supra note 21.
120. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d at 434, 551 P.2d
at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
121. Id.
122. See supra note 38.
123. The Board of Medical Quality Assurance has the authority to request the
superior court of any county to enjoin a physician from conduct which would be in viola-
tion of the Medical Practice Act. 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 1312 § 2 (codified at CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 2311 (Deering Supp. 1983)); see supra note 118.
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person who is not his patient.12 4 But, by undertaking the task of self-
policing 125 for the protection of the public's health care interests,
physicians assume the duty of carrying out this function with due
care. 26 The American Medical Association places the responsibility
for policing on its individual members.2  This affirmative conduct
imposes a duty for the impaired physician's colleague to exercise rea-
sonable care for the protection of patients from the risks created by
a chemically-dependent physician. 28 Reporting an untreated, chemi-
cally-dependent physician satisfies this duty.
If a physician fails to report an untreated chemically-dependent
colleague and because of chemical dependence that colleague injures
a patient, then the failure to report should be a proximate cause of
the patient's injury. Losses incurred by the patient because of this
injury should be spread through the malpractice insurance coverage
of the chemically-dependent colleague and the non-reporting physi-
cian. Legislative policy would support this increased liability for non-
reporting physicians in the same manner as it supported the doctrine
of corporate hospital liability.1 29 The legislature's intent was not to
immunize physicians from negligence liability but to protect and fur-
ther the patient's health care.
The special relationship between physicians in conjunction with
the satisfaction of policy considerations and the physician's assump-
tion of a duty to self-police, strongly support the imposition of a duty
to report upon those physicians who know of an untreated chemi-
124. The Tarasoff court did not recognize a relationship between the psychiatrist
and the victim even though the psychiatrist was aware of the victim's identity. Tarasoff
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 436, 551 P.2d 334, 343, 131 Cal. Rptr.
14, 23 (1976). See also Rainer v. Grossman, 31 Cal. App. 3d 539, 543, 107 Cal. Rptr.
469, 471 (1973) (a visiting professor who suggested surgery for an unknown patient dur-
ing a lecture had not established a physician-patient relationship).
125. For a discussion of self-policing see supra note 118.
126. Undertaking an affirmative course of conduct that affects the interests of an-
other, imposes a duty to act and creates liability for negligence or a failure to act.
Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Ltd., 67 Cal. 2d 232, 238, 430 P.2d 68, 72, 60 Cal. Rptr.
510, 514 (1967).
127. See supra note 38.
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965):
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to an-
other which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's
person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if. ..
the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
Id.
129. Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 346-47, 183 Cal. Rptr.
156, 165 (1982).
cally-dependent physician. The physician knowing of a chemically-
dependent colleague who refuses to voluntarily undergo rehabilita-
tion should be required to report his colleague to the Board of Medi-
cal Quality Assurance. The imposition of such a duty would also
satisfy the judicial policies of accident reduction and loss distribution
that have previously been used to justify expansion of the incidence
of liability.
The current existence in California of a common law duty to re-
port eliminates the need for a mandatory reporting statute since both
achieve the same result. The enactment of a statutory duty to report
would be counterproductive. The mandatory reporting statute of
New York, considered a model legislative effort in this area, is de-
tailed and complex. This complexity often results in a time-consum-
ing process which can last months before any action is taken. 3 Con-
fusion about the details of a mandatory reporting statute, even one
exempting reporting by rehabilitation committee members, might
create reluctance on the part of the chemically-dependent physician
to voluntarily seek treatment.
CONCLUSION
While all available measures must be used to protect the public
from hazards created by a chemically-dependent physician, measures
of questionable effectiveness should not be enacted if they would ne-
gate the benefits and reduce the credibility of an established pro-
gram. The Impaired Physician Program in California was enacted to
protect the public health and safety by creating an incentive for the
chemically-dependent physician to voluntarily seek treatment before
the quality of medical care he delivers deteriorates. The inclusion of
a mandatory reporting requirement in this program would discour-
age a physician from entering a voluntary rehabilitation program
and would discourage colleagues and family of a chemically-depen-
dent physician from persuading him to seek rehabilitation. A
mandatory reporting requirement should not be enacted as part of
the Impaired Physician Program or as part of the Medical Practice
Act in general.
The corporate liability of hospitals should be expanded to those
cases when the hospital has actual or constructive knowledge of a
physician's chemical dependence and fails to restrict his privileges
until rehabilitation is accomplished. To ensure the full cooperation of
the medical staff in identifying a chemically-dependent physician to
the hospital, the right of the hospital to dismiss a silent staff member
must be recognized.
Personal liability of individual physicians should be expanded by
130. Fama, supra note 42, at 115-16.
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the recognition of a duty of care. This duty would be owed by physi-
cians to the public and would require physicians to report their col-
leagues whom they know to be chemically dependent and who refuse
to voluntarily undergo rehabilitation. The combined incentives cre-
ated by a nonpunitive voluntary rehabilitation program and by the
potential for tort liability will serve to afford the public protection
from the hazards of the chemically-dependent physician.
JUNE E. FISHER

